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I. INTRODUCTION
During this Survey period (December 1, 2016 through November 30,
2017), a number of state and federal courts issued opinions regarding ar-
* Member at Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz PLLC, B.S. Tennessee Tech Uni-
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bitration, including cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (the FAA) and the Texas Arbitration Act (Texas Civil
Practices and Remedies Code ch. 171) (the TAA). Subjects discussed in
these cases and addressed herein include: arbitration agreement issues;
non-signatories; and court involvement. Validity and scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement, including delegation of arbitrability questions, continue
to be submitted to courts by motions to compel. Unconscionability and
illusory promises continue to be urged as defenses to motions to compel.
The six different methods by which a non-signatory can either be com-
pelled to arbitrate or can utilize arbitration are found in cases during this
Survey period. What constitutes a final order or award, the expansion of
judicial review, vacatur grounds, and modification of awards were also
considered during this Survey period.
II. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ISSUES
When assessing arbitration cases from this Survey period, it is impor-
tant to remember the summary nature of the motion to compel. Two sec-
tions in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code instruct the court to
summarily decide disputes involving the existence of an arbitration agree-
ment. First, § 171.021(b) states that “[i]f a party opposing an [arbitration]
application . . . denies the existence of the agreement [to arbitrate], the
court shall summarily determine that issue.”1 Additionally, § 171.023(b)
provides that “[i]f there is a substantial bona fide dispute as to whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists, the court shall try the issue promptly and
summarily.”2 Several cases from this Survey period mention the summary
nature of the motion to compel.3
One of these cases, Fitness Entertainment Limited v. Hurst,4 demon-
strates that a trial court can conduct an evidentiary hearing at the same
time as the hearing for the motion to compel. Fitness Entertainment was
doing business as Planet Fitness. Planet filed a motion to compel Hurst to
arbitrate. Hurst filed a response, which included an affidavit that stated
that “he did not sign an arbitration agreement.”5 On appeal, Planet con-
1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021(b) (West 2011).
2. Id. § 171.023.
3. Rocha v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. EP-17-CV-73-PRM, 2017 WL 4399575,
at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017) (mem. op.); Mayton v. Tempoe, LLC, No. SA-17-CV-179-
XR, 2017 WL 2484849, at *8, *10 n.1 (W.D. Tex. June 7, 2017) (noting in a footnote that
since there are no facts in dispute the court can summarily decide the issue of whether a
valid arbitration agreement exists); Tantrum St. LLC v. Carson, No. 05-16-01096-CV, 2017
WL 3275901, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Geo-Tech Found.
Repair v. Leggett, No. 02-16-00289-CV, 2017 WL 1173840, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Mar. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Doe v. Columbia N. Hills Hosp. Subsidiary, L.P., 521
S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied) (holding that since there were no
genuine issues of material fact remand for an evidentiary hearing was not necessary);
Human Biostar, Inc. v. Celltex Therapeutics Corp., 514 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
4. 527 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied).
5. Id. at 701.
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tended that the trial court should have followed a “two-step procedure.”6
According to Planet, the court should have held a hearing on the motion
to compel. Then, if an issue of material fact was raised during the hearing,
the court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing. Instead, “the
trial court viewed the hearing [for the motion to compel] as being eviden-
tiary in nature.”7
The El Paso Court of Appeals held that since “Planet concede[d] that
the parties’ competing affidavits created a dispute of material fact which
required the trial court to hear evidence[,]”8 the trial court did not err
when it conducted the evidentiary hearing.9 Planet did not seek a contin-
uance to introduce evidence and waited until after direct examination en-
ded to object.
A. VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT
Courts will not grant a party’s motion to compel if the underlying arbi-
tration agreement is not valid and enforceable. The party seeking to com-
pel arbitration must prove that an agreement to arbitrate exists.10 If the
party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement meets its initial bur-
den, the party opposing arbitration must successfully raise an affirmative
defense if it wishes to avoid arbitration. The first part of this section dis-
cusses cases from this Survey period that address whether the party seek-
ing to compel arbitration met its initial burden to prove that an
arbitration agreement existed. Next, this section provides a summary of
cases from the Survey period where a party opposing arbitration raised
an affirmative defense.
1. Existence of Agreement to Arbitrate
Often, the party opposing arbitration claims that there is not a valid
arbitration agreement. Arguments range from absence of an authenti-
cated document to inadequate notice of an employer’s arbitration
policy.11
In Ladymon v. Lewis,12 homeowners sued Metro and Ladymon for
construction defects. Metro and Ladymon were not able to produce the
original contracts signed by the homeowners. Instead, Metro and
Ladymon supported their motion to compel with copies of contracts the
homeowners allegedly signed coupled with an affidavit. In the affidavit,
Ladymon claimed that the homeowners executed at least two documents
6. Id. at 704.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 705.
10. Ladymon v. Lewis, No. 05-16-00776-CV, 2017 WL 3097652, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Dallas July 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166
S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)).
11. See Ladymon, 2017 WL 3097652, at *3; see also Doe v. Columbia N. Hills Hosp.
Subsidiary, L.P., 521 S.W.3d 76, 78 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied).
12. Ladymon, 2017 WL 3097652, at *1.
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that contained arbitration agreements. The homeowners objected and
claimed that they “do not recall signing any documents . . . requiring
[a]rbitration.”13
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that Ladymon and Metro established
a valid arbitration agreement through the affidavit and contracts copies.14
The court of appeals noted the homeowners’ statements that they “did
not ‘recall’ signing” an arbitration agreement lacked probative value be-
cause “an affiant’s belief about the facts is legally insufficient.”15 Further,
“the absence of a party’s signature does not necessarily destroy an other-
wise valid contract.”16
Other cases from this Survey period also illustrate that arbitration
agreements can be enforced even in situations where the party opposing
arbitration does not recall signing an arbitration agreement or claims that
they did not sign an agreement.17
During this Survey period, many employees contested the validity of
arbitration agreements that their employer sought to enforce. When an
employer can prove that an employee had adequate notice of the em-
ployer’s arbitration policy, the employee will be bound to arbitrate the
claims against the employer. For example, in Valenzuela v. Crest-Mexico
Corporation,18 two employees brought a class action against their em-
ployers for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendants
moved to compel arbitration based on a 2014 arbitration agreement and a
2016 arbitration agreement. The defendants claimed that the agreements
were hand-delivered as well as mailed to each of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs claimed that they “did not receive effective notice of the
. . . [arbitration] Agreements.”19 All of the plaintiffs asserted that they did
13. Id. at *3.
14. Id. at *5.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *4.
17. See Humphreys v. Houston Pizza Venture Rest. Grp., No. H-17-0935, 2017 WL
4351726, at *1, *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) (mem. op.) (determining that defendant could
compel arbitration despite plaintiff’s claims that she did not sign an arbitration agreement
or electronically agree to arbitrate her claims); Thick v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 4:16-
CV-00733, 2017 WL 108297, at *2, *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017) (mem. op.) (holding that
even though employee did not recall signing an arbitration agreement, the employer could
enforce the arbitration agreement because the employer was able to prove that the em-
ployee electronically consented to the arbitration agreement.); Wright v. Igloo Prods.
Corp., No. H-16-202, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182810, at *3–8, *10 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2016)
(mem. op.) (allowing defendant to compel arbitration despite plaintiff’s claims that her
signature was forged), adopted by 2017 WL 354239 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017); MiCocina,
Ltd., v. Balderas-Villanueva, No. 05-16-01507-CV, 2017 WL 4857017, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Oct. 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the plaintiff must arbitrate his
claims even though he did not sign the arbitration agreement because the plaintiff signed
an acknowledgement that specifically referenced the arbitration agreement); Util. Trailer
Sales Se. Tex., Inc. v. Lozano, No. 04-16-00644-CV, 2017 WL 3045861, at *1 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio July 19, 2017 pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that although the employee
did not sign an arbitration clause at the start of his employment in 2013, the arbitration
agreement he signed in 2010 when he was previously employed by his employer could be
used to compel arbitration).
18. No. 3:16-CV-1129-D, 2017 WL 3311203, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017) (mem. op.).
19. Id. at *2.
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not receive one of the arbitration agreements, and one plaintiff main-
tained that he did not receive the other agreement. According to the
plaintiffs, they did not receive notice by mail because the defendants
could not provide proof that the agreements were mailed. Lastly, the
plaintiffs asserted that they did not receive adequate notice because certi-
fied copies of the Spanish translation were not provided, and the plain-
tiffs do not speak English fluently. The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas rejected each of these arguments because the
“plaintiffs received notice of the 2016 Agreement and then continued to
work and receive pay. [One of the defendants] avers that he delivered the
2016 Agreement to plaintiffs by hand and by mail, and he offers docu-
mentation of the mailing.”20
Despite the plaintiff’s objections, the district court determined that the
plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate because when “an at-will em-
ployee . . . receives notice of an employers’ arbitration policy and contin-
ues working [the employee] has accepted the policy as a matter of law.”21
If an employee does not receive adequate notice of the employer’s ar-
bitration policy, the employee will not be bound to arbitrate. For exam-
ple, in Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Vance,22 Vance
received an email that mentioned that the law firm that she worked for
was updating its employment policies. The firm’s motion to compel arbi-
tration was denied because Vance did not have notice of the arbitration
policy.23 The firm did not prove that Vance received express notice of the
arbitration policy, because although the email mentioned that the firm’s
dispute resolution policy was updated, the email did not “use the word
‘arbitration.’”24 Further, the email did not include the arbitration policy
as an attachment. Additionally, the firm did not prove that Vance had
implied notice of the arbitration policy because the email did not “fairly
suggest that the firm was implementing a binding arbitration policy.”25
The notice must be unequivocal in order to bind the employee to arbi-
trate claims that arose prior to the notice. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that the notice provided in Hernandez v.
Air Resources Americas26 was not unequivocal notice. In that case, the
employees signed an arbitration agreement. Later, the employer sent an
email that limited the arbitration agreement to “prospective claims.”27
The district court determined that the notice that the employer provided
the employee was not unequivocal notice because of the contradiction
between the email and the arbitration agreement.28 Thus, the plaintiffs
20. Id. at *3.
21. Id.
22. No. 1:17-CV-133-RP, 2017 WL 2241538, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 22, 2017).
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id. at *2–3.
25. Id. at *4.
26. No. H-17-689, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185021, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017).
27. Id. at *5.
28. Id.
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could not be compelled to arbitrate their claims that arose prior to the
date that the notice was signed.29
Several other employees successfully defeated motions to compel dur-
ing this Survey period by contesting the validity of the arbitration
agreement.30
2. Affirmative Defenses
If the party seeking to compel arbitration proves that a valid agreement
to arbitrate exists, the party resisting arbitration can raise an affirmative
defense. Two of the major arguments raised to defeat arbitration agree-
ments in this Survey period were unconscionability and illusory promise.
In many instances, the courts found that the arbitration agreement at is-
sue was neither unconscionable nor illusory.31 Others seeking to compel
arbitration were not so lucky.
Two cases from this Survey period found the arbitration agreement il-
lusory. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas deter-
mined that an arbitration agreement between an employer and an
employee was illusory in Presta v. Omni Hotels Management Corpora-
tion.32 Omni was permitted to modify the arbitration agreement “with
respect to claims of which Omni is aware but which are not formally
brought under the [p]rogram.”33 The district court determined that the
29. Id. at *5–6.
30. See FC Background, LLC v. Fritze, No. 05-17-00277-CV, 2017 WL 5559594, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 16, 2017, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (holding that there was no en-
forceable arbitration clause because the non-compete agreement that the employee signed
contained a merger clause and did not contain an arbitration clause); Penn. Va. Oil & Gas
GP, LLC v. De La Garza, No. 01-15-00867-CV, 2017 WL 2871784, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] July 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (determining that employee was not
required to arbitrate through his employer’s dispute resolution program because the entity
that wanted to compel arbitration could not take advantage of the program).
31. See Ruiz v. AH 2005 Mgmt., LP, No. EP-17-CV-197-PRM, 2017 WL 4639702, at
*2–3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2017) (mem. op.) (concluding that an arbitration agreement was
not illusory because the employer had to provide notice to the employee before making
changes to the policy); Valenzuela v. Crest-Mex Corp., No. 3:16-CV-1129-D, 2017 WL
3311203, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017) (mem. op.) (determining that the arbitration agree-
ment was not unconscionable because even though the plaintiffs could not speak English,
Spanish translations were provided); Xome Holdings LLC v. Derbonne, No. 4:16-CV-
00550-ALM, 2017 WL 2402578, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2017) (mem. op.) (determining
that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because the plaintiffs negotiated the
terms of the contract); Lockett v. Conn Appliances, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-703-ALM-CAN,
2017 WL 2129316, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2017) (holding that a delegation provision in
an adhesion contract was not unconscionable), adopted by 2017 WL 2120010 (E.D. Tex.
May 16, 2017); Seim v. HomeAway, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-479-LY, 2017 WL 3478488, at *9–10
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Arnold v. HomeAway, Inc., 890 F.3d 546 (5th Cir.
2018) (determining that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because both
parties assented to the clearly stated terms); MiCocina, Ltd., v. Balderas-Villanueva, No.
05-16-01507-CV, 2017 WL 4857017, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 27, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (holding that an arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because there
was no evidence that the employee was coerced to sign the agreement or mislead about the
contents of the agreement. Further, the agreement was not illusory because the employer
could only prospectively terminate the agreement).
32. No. 4:17-cv-0912, 2017 WL 3038219, at *7 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2017) (mem. op.).
33. Id. at *6.
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contract was illusory because Omni could modify the agreement after it
received notice that an employee has a potential claim against Omni.34
Thus, the employee could not be compelled to arbitrate.35
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas reached a
similar result in Freeman v. Progress Residential Property Manager,
LLC.36 The agreement to arbitrate was “not supported by consideration”
because Progress could unilaterally revoke the agreement.37
When a court determines that a portion of an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable, the court can sever the unconscionable portion of the
arbitration agreement and enforce the rest of the agreement. Two cases
from this Survey period illustrate this point. First, a fee splitting provision
in an arbitration agreement was unconscionable in Gutierrez v. Commu-
nity Action Corporation.38 Gutierrez sued her former employer for dis-
crimination and wrongful termination. The arbitration agreement called
for the parties to split the costs of arbitration evenly. Gutierrez estab-
lished that she did not have the means to pay for arbitration costs except
for the filing fee. Based on this information, the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas determined that the fee-splitting provision
was unconscionable, and severed it from the rest of the agreement.39
In Edwards v. DoorDash,40 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas applied California law41 to determine that portions of an
arbitration agreement were unconscionable.42 The agreement was proce-
durally unconscionable partly because the plaintiff lacked bargaining
power.43 Specifically, the plaintiff had to sign the agreement in order to
work for the defendant (take-it-or-leave-it).44
According to the district court, two provisions of the agreement were
substantively unconscionable. First, the provision that stated that the ar-
bitration will take place in Palo Alto was substantively unconscionable
because the plaintiff resided in Houston.45 It would be very costly for the
plaintiff to arbitrate in Palo Alto.46 Additionally, the provision that pro-
vided for cost splitting was unconscionable because the provision “im-
poses costs on [p]laintiff that he would not have to pay through utilization
of the judicial process.”47 The district court compelled arbitration after
34. Id.
35. Id. at *7.
36. No. 3:16-CV-356, 2017 WL 2954409, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2017).
37. Id.
38. No. 2:16-CV-291, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174680, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2016).
39. Id. at *7, *9.
40. No. H-16-225, 2016 WL 7852532, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016) (mem. op.),
adopted by 2017 WL 244862 (S.D. Tex. Jan 19, 2017).
41. “California law holds that an agreement must be both procedurally and substan-
tively unconscionable in order to be considered unconscionable.” Id. at *6.
42. Id. at *14.
43. Id. at *8.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *10.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *11.
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the district court severed the unconscionable provisions from the rest of
the arbitration agreement.48
B. SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT
After the court determines that there is a valid arbitration agreement,
the court normally determines whether the dispute is within the scope of
the arbitration agreement. However, there are agreements that delegate
arbitrability to the arbitrator.
1. Court Determining Arbitrability
The trial court must compel arbitration when the dispute is within the
scope of the arbitration agreement. For example, in S.P. v. N.P.,49 the
parties signed a mediated settlement agreement during their divorce. The
mediated settlement agreement provided for arbitration to resolve dis-
putes between the parties about the divorce. The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held that the trial court erred when it signed a final divorce de-
cree rather than compelling arbitration, because the disputes addressed in
the decree fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.50 A few
other cases illustrate that when the dispute falls within the scope of the
arbitration clause, the court is required to compel arbitration.51
If an arbitration clause uses broad or expansive language, the “pre-
sumption of arbitrability is particularly applicable.”52 If the arbitration
clause is broad, the court is more likely to compel arbitration.53 However,
even if an arbitration clause uses expansive language, the party seeking to
compel arbitration cannot rely on conclusory statements to support their
motion to compel.54 Rather, that party must point to a specific dispute
between the parties that falls within the scope of the agreement to arbi-
trate.55 In Terrell v. Price,56 the First Houston Court of Appeals held that
the trial court properly denied arbitration. The party seeking to arbitrate
48. Id. at *12.
49. No. 02-16-00278-CV, 2017 WL 3821887, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
50. Id. at *6.
51. See Shoebacca, Ltd, v. K-2 Corp., No. 3:17-CV-0473-G, 2017 WL 3115159, at *3, *5
(N.D. Tex. July 21, 2017) (mem. op.); Stockade Cos., LLC v. Kelly Rest. Grp., LLC, No. A-
17-CV-143 RP, 2017 WL 1968328, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2017); Charging Bison, LLC v.
Interstate Battery Franchising & Dev., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-3479-G, 2017 WL 1296454, at *3,
*4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2017) (mem. op.); CRS Indus. v. MacDonald Sys., No. 01-16-00783-
CV, 2017 WL 1881166, at *2, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.); MAPP Constr., LLC v. BlackAll Mech., Inc., No. 05-16-00703-CV, 2017 WL
1046770, at *4, *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
52. See Terrell v. Price, No. 01-16-00376-CV, 2017 WL 2980166, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotations omitted); see
also AdvoCare GP, LLC v. Heath, No. 05-16-00409-CV, 2017 WL 56402, at *5–6 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Jan. 5, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a broad arbitration clause
included an employee’s tort claims).
53. Terrell, 2017 2017 WL 2980166, at *5.
54. Id. at *5–6.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *6.
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relied on conclusory statements to support the motion to compel. These
conclusory statements were not enough to warrant arbitration. The mo-
tion to compel was denied because it was impossible to discern whether
the dispute fell within the scope of the agreement based only on con-
clusory statements.57
The trial court should not compel arbitration if the party seeking to
compel arbitration cannot prove that the dispute fell within the scope of
the agreement. Several cases from the Survey period illustrate this
point.58 An arbitration clause that was limited to “dispute[s] . . . concern-
ing the interpretation of the terms of [the a]greement” was the issue in
North American Deer Registry v. DNA Solutions.59 Deer Registry sought
to litigate claims that did not “concern the interpretation of the [agree-
ment]” and simultaneously sought to arbitrate a breach of contract
claim.60 DNA filed a motion to dismiss the case so the parties could arbi-
trate. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas deter-
mined that the arbitration clause was “narrow.”61 The district court held
that Deer Registry’s unfair competition claim should be retained by the
district court because it did not involve contract interpretation.62 The dis-
trict court also determined that the trade secrets claim did not fall within
the scope of the arbitration clause after a hearing on the issue.63 The dis-
trict court reasoned that even though “the [c]ontract will be evidence of
protection of the trade secrets . . . it is not dispositive of the entire trade
secret history.”64
One other interesting point to note concerning the scope of arbitration
agreements is that a court’s order concerning the enforcement of an arbi-
tration agreement cannot contradict the arbitration agreement. For exam-
ple, in Estate of MacDonald v. Reeder Road Saf-T-Loc,65 the Dallas
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion by
requiring the use of an arbitration process that was different from the
process in the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement stated
57. Id.
58. See United States ex rel. Fisher v. Homeward Residential, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-461,
No. 4:12-CV-543, at *3, 2017 WL 841149 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) (mem. op.) (finding that
since the issue was outside the scope of the arbitration agreement the motion to compel
should be denied); Balfour Beatty Constr., LLC v. Eagle Contr. Servs., LLC, No. 03-15-
00806-CV, 2017 WL 3471060, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(determining that the motion to compel was properly denied because the arbitration agree-
ment specifically excluded the dispute at issue); Brittingham v. Mirabent, No. 04-17-00028-
CV, 2017 WL 2852627, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 5, 2017 no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding that claims that were independent of the agreement fell outside of the obligation
to arbitrate.).
59. No. 4:17-CV-00062, 2017 WL 2120015, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2017) (mem. op.).
60. Id. at *3 (internal quotations and modifications omitted).
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id. at *6.
63. N. Am. Deer Registry, Inc. v. DNA Sols., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00062, 2017 WL
2402579, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2017) (mem. op.).
64. Id.
65. No. 05-16-00960-CV, 2017 WL 1427693, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 19, 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
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that the parties should select an appraiser. The agreement further pro-
vided that if the parties could not agree on an appraiser, the parties
should each select an appraiser, and then the two appointed appraisers
would select a third appraiser. Instead of adhering to this process, the
trial court ordered the Appraisal Institute to appoint a panel of apprais-
ers. The court of appeals determined that this action was an abuse of
discretion because the process was not authorized in the arbitration
agreement.66
2. Arbitrator Determining Arbitrability
Arbitration agreements may contain arbitrability delegation clauses. A
court facing a delegation clause should ask “whether the parties clearly
and unmistakably intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an
arbitrator.”67 If so, the court should grant the motion to compel so that
the arbitrator can decide arbitrability questions. Many cases from the
Survey period illustrate this point.68 The motion to compel arbitration
should not be granted “if the argument that the claim at hand is within
the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’”69 If the
party seeking to compel arbitration cannot reasonably argue that the dis-
pute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement the court should
deny the motion as “wholly groundless.”70
One case from this Survey period provides an example of how the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determines whether a claim is
“wholly groundless.”71 In that case, IQ argued that the district court
66. Id. at *5.
67. Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 2017).
68. See Ambulatory Servs. of P.R., LLC v. Sankar Nephrology Grp., LLC, No. 4:17-
CV-230-A, 2017 WL 1954932, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2017) (mem. op.); Gemini Ins. Co. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. H-17-1044, 2017 WL 1354149, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 13, 2017); Hanchett v. Port of Houston Auth., No. 4:11-CV-1695, 2017 WL
1190881, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2017); Fozard v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 3d 789, 794
(N.D. Tex. 2017) (mem. op.); Zorilla v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-615, 2017 WL
3278061, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2017); Cubria v. Uber Techs., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 541,
546 (W.D. Tex. 2017); 20/20 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Blevins, Civil No. 4:16-CV-810-Y, 2017 WL
527959, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2017); Edwards v. DoorDash, Inc., No. H-16-225, 2017 WL
7852532, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016) (mem. op.), adopted by 2017 WL 244862 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2017); Super Starr Int’l, LLC v. Fresh Tex. Produce, LLC, No. 13-17-00184-CV,
2017 WL 4054395, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Dow Roofing Sys., LLC v. Great Comm’n Baptist Church, LLC, No. 02-16-00395-CV, 2017
WL 3298264, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 3, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.);
Trafigura Pte. Ltd. v. CNA Metals Ltd., 526 S.W. 3d 612, 613 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Emp. Sols. McKinney, LLC v. Wilkerson, No. 05-16-00283-CV, 2017
WL 1908626, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Gilbert v. Rain
& Hail Ins., No. 02-16-00277-CV, 2017 WL 710702, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 23,
2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Human Biostar, Inc. v. Celltex Therapeutics Corp., 514
S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
69. Archer & White Sales, 878 F.3d at 492 (quoting Douglas v. Regions Bank, 757 F.3d
460, 464 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and modifications omitted)).
70. Id.
71. IQ Prods. Co. v. WD-40 Co., 871 F3.d 344 (5th Cir. 2017). Note that the Fifth
Circuit cited to IQ Prods. in Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. in support of
the “wholly groundless” standard. Archer & White Sales, 878 F.3d at 492.
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erred when it granted WD-40’s motion to compel arbitration. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgement, and held that “[i]n light of
the ‘exceptional’ nature of the wholly groundless test and the competing,
plausible interpretations of the 1996 Agreement’s meaning and scope, we
conclude that WD-40’s assertion of arbitrability is not wholly
groundless.”72
III. NON-SIGNATORIES
In the Survey period, parties often raised the issue of whether a non-
signatory is bound by an arbitration agreement, and whether a non-signa-
tory can enforce an arbitration agreement. Non-signatories can compel
arbitration or be compelled to arbitrate based on six theories: “(1) incor-
poration by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) estop-
pel; and (6) third-party beneficiary.”73 All of these theories were raised
during this Survey period.
A. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
In order for an arbitration clause to be enforceable under the incorpo-
ration by reference theory, “the contract that allegedly incorporates an-
other, unsigned document must, in the first instance, be a signed,
enforceable contract.”74 “The party seeking to compel arbitration must”
show that the underlying contract is valid.75 International Corrugated &
Packing Supplies v. Lear illustrates this point. Lear purchased packing
supplies from Corrugated. Lear claimed that the arbitration clause found
on its website was incorporated by reference in purchase orders Lear sent
to Corrugated. Lear could not prove that the purchase orders were valid
contracts. Thus, the terms and conditions, which contain the arbitration
clause, could not be incorporated by reference into the purchase orders,
and Lear could not compel arbitration.76
B. ASSUMPTION
Non-signatories can compel arbitration if an agreement that contains
an arbitration clause is assigned to the non-signatory, or if the non-signa-
tory is a successor to the agreement. “[U]nder Texas law, an assignee
stands in the shoes of the assignor.”77 Thus, the assignee can assert any
rights that the assignor would be able to assert.78 If a non-signatory is
72. IQ Prods., 871 F.3d at 352–53 (emphasis in original).
73. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005). See Sapic v.
Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2003).
74. Int’l Corrugated & Packing Supplies, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. EP-15-CV-00405-
DCG, 2016 WL 7410771, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2016) (mem. op.).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Mason v. Regions Bank, No. 1:16-CV-1299-RP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111458, at
*5 (W.D. Tex. July 18, 2017) (quoting Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d
909, 921 (Tex. 2010)).
78. Id.
14 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
assigned a contract that contains an arbitration agreement, the non-signa-
tory can compel arbitration. For example, in Mason v. Regions Bank,79
the plaintiff purchased a car from a car dealership. Regions Bank was
assigned the contract between the plaintiff and the car dealership, and
Regions Bank sought to compel arbitration under the terms of the con-
tract. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas allowed
Regions Bank to “invoke the dealership’s right to compel arbitration”
because of the assignment.80
Similarly, when a non-signatory is a successor to an agreement that
contains an arbitration agreement, the non-signatory can compel arbitra-
tion. Adams v. Energy Transfer Partners81 illustrates this point. The plain-
tiff’s employer, Susser, merged with Energy Transfer Partners. The
plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement with Susser prior to the merger.
The plaintiff later sued Energy Transfer Partners for wrongful termina-
tion. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas allowed
Energy Transfer Partners to compel arbitration because the arbitration
agreement stated “it is binding on Susser and its successors.”82
Under the assumption theory, the signatory must prove that the non-
signatory was a successor to the contract, or was assigned the contract.83
In G.T. Leach Builders v. Sapphire Condominiums Association, G.T.
Leach sought to compel Sapphire to arbitrate its claims.84 G.T. Leach did
not meet its burden to prove that Sapphire was an assignee or a successor
to the contract that contained an arbitration clause.85 Thus, G.T. Leach
could not compel arbitration.
In Toll Austin, TX, LLC v. Dusing,86 Brodney Pool sold the Dusings a
home. Pool purchased the home from Toll. The Dusings were not bound
by an arbitration agreement between Toll and Pool. Toll claimed that the
Dusings should be compelled to arbitrate because the assumption excep-
tion applied. The Austin Court of Appeals noted that “the assumption
theory . . . only applies to contracts that have been assigned from one
party to another.”87 The theory did not apply in this instance because the
agreement specifically stated that assignment was prohibited.
A non-signatory can be compelled to arbitrate if the non-signatory
manifests an intent to arbitrate. In Pavecon Holding Co v. Tuzinski,88 the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas held that Pavecon
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id. at *5.
81. No. 2:16-CV-400, 2017 WL 2349028, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2017) (mem. op.),
adopted by 2017 WL 2347425 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2017).
82. Id. at *2.
83. G.T. Leach Builders, L.L.C. v. Sapphire Condos. Ass’n, No. 13-16-00293-CV, 2017
WL 3878238, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 24, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *9–18.
86. No. 03-16-00621-CV, 2016 WL 7187482, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 7, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
87. Id. at *4 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
88. No. 4:16-CV-888-ALM-CAN, 2017 WL 2540581, at *4 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2017),
adopted by 2017 WL 2536145 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2017) (mem.).
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could not be compelled to arbitrate based on the assumption exception.
Pavecon did not manifest an intent to arbitrate. “Pavecon did not agree
to arbitrate” or take steps to comply with the arbitration agreement.
Thus, the assumption exception did not apply.89
C. AGENCY
Two cases from this Survey period illustrate that when a principal signs
a valid arbitration agreement, its agents can compel arbitration even if
the agent did not sign the agreement.90 Dargahi v. Handa demonstrates
this point. A contract between the Handas and Lakeway Custom Homes
contained an arbitration clause. Lakeway Custom Homes was operated
by Yekks. After a dispute arose, the Handas sued Yekks, Pejman, and
Kamran. All of the defendants moved to compel arbitration. The Austin
Court of Appeals allowed Pejman and Kamran to compel arbitration be-
cause they were agents of Yekk.91 The court of appeals noted that arbitra-
tion was proper because “[t]he Handas’ claims against both Pejman and
Kamran are in substance claims against Yekk, and the alleged actionable
conduct . . . occurred in connection with their performance under the
contract as representatives of Yekk.”92
Waterstone on Lake Conroe, Inc. v. Williams93 provides another exam-
ple of a situation where a non-signatory could compel arbitration by
agency. The Williamses signed a purchase agreement for a new home
with Virgin. Steve Bowen was the President of Waterstone and Virgin.
The Williamses were not satisfied with the construction of the home, and
filed suit against Bowen, Virgin, and Waterstone. The Beaumont Court of
Appeals determined that Bowen could compel arbitration because “the
arbitration agreement expressly provides that officers are non-signatories
that are considered parties to the agreement.”94
Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Mata95 illustrates that principals can-
not compel “agents to participate in arbitration based on an agreement
signed by the principals and unknown to the agents.” A predecessor of
Santander entered into a contract with Mata for the sale of a vehicle that
contained an arbitration clause. When Mata did not pay, Santander re-
possessed the vehicle with the help of its agents, Redshift and Centroplex.
Mata sued Santander, and in response, Santander filed cross-claims
against Redshift and Centroplex. Santander attempted to compel Red-
shift and Centroplex to arbitrate. The Austin Court of Appeals deter-
89. Id.
90. Dargahi v. Handa, No. 03-17-00386-CV, 2017 WL 5247517, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—
Austin Nov. 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
91. Id. at *3–4.
92. Id. at *13.
93. No. 09-17-00071-CV, 2017 WL 3298234, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 3, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
94. Id. at *4.
95. No. 03-14-00782-CV, 2017 WL 1208767, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 29, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
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mined that Santander could not use the agency theory to compel its own
agents to arbitrate.96
It is possible for a non-signatory to be bound to arbitrate based on the
actions of an individual serving as the non-signatory’s power of attorney.
Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark97 illustrates this
point. Beverly Wellner served as Joe Wellner’s power of attorney, and
Janis Clark served as Olive Clark’s power of attorney. Joe and Olive re-
ceived nursing care in a Kindred nursing home, and their respective
agents signed all of the intake documents, including an arbitration agree-
ment. After Joe and Olive died, their estates sued Kindred, and Kindred
moved to compel arbitration. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied arbi-
tration, partly because both power of attorney documents did not clearly
state that the agent could bind the principal to arbitration. The United
States Supreme Court called this rule the “clear-statement rule.”98 On
appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the clear-statement rule
could not prevent arbitration, because arbitration agreements need to be
“on an equal plane with other contracts.”99
The party seeking to compel arbitration must prove that the requisite
“principal/agent” relationship exists. In Albertson’s Holdings, LLC v.
Kay,100 Albertson’s failed to show that Ruth Kay was acting as an agent
for Frank Kay when she signed an arbitration agreement. Ruth and Frank
were husband and wife. Ruth was employed by Albertson’s and signed an
arbitration agreement that attempted to bind Frank to arbitrate his claims
against Albertson’s. According to the Tyler Court of Appeals “[t]he mari-
tal relationship does not, in itself, make one spouse the agent of the other
spouse.”101 Albertson’s could not compel Frank to arbitrate his claims
because Albertson’s did not establish that Ruth was acting as Frank’s
agent.102
D. ALTER EGO
When the non-signatory is acting as an alter ego for a signatory the
other signatory can compel arbitration. In order to use this theory to
compel arbitration, the signatory seeking to compel arbitration must go
further than merely proving that the signatory and non-signatory are re-
lated entities.
In Pavecon Holding Co. v. Tuzinski,103 Pavecon sued Tuzinski and
Kansas Asphalt. Pavecon leased its employees from a related company
known as Labcon. While Tuzinski was employed by Pavecon, he was also
96. Id. at *7–9.
97. 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 (2017).
98. Id. at 1426.
99. Id. at 1427.
100. 514 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.).
101. Id. at 884.
102. Id.
103. No. 4:16-CV-888-ALM-CAN, 2017 WL 2540581 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2017) (mem.
op.), adopted by 2017 WL 2536145 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2017).
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a Labcon employee because Pavecon leased Tuzinski from Labcon.
Tuzinski attempted to compel Pavecon to arbitrate its claims against
Tuzinski based on an arbitration agreement contained in Labcon’s em-
ployee manual. One argument that Tuzinski asserted was that Pavecon
was an alter ego of Labcon. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas determined that Pavecon was not an alter ego of Labcon
because “while Labcon and Pavecon are closely related companies, there
is no showing or allegation that they are the same entity and/or that their
separate and distinct corporate statuses can be lawfully disregarded in the
instant suit.”104 Thus, Tuzinski’s alter ego theory failed.
E. ESTOPPEL
The most popular non-signatory theory raised during this Survey pe-
riod was estoppel. Parties cited direct benefits estoppel and equitable es-
toppel to support their motions to compel. This section addresses direct
benefits estoppel first, and equitable estoppel second.
1. Direct Benefits Estoppel
Under the theory of direct benefits estoppel, a plaintiff that accepts
benefits of a contract cannot avoid an arbitration provision contained in
the same contract. Note that in order for direct benefits estoppel to apply,
there must be a valid contract. One case from this Survey period illus-
trates this point. In Oak Crest Manor Nursing Home v. Barba,105 Barba’s
son was a resident at Oak Crest. Barba, acting as her son’s guardian, sued
Oak Crest for negligence relating to her son’s care. Oak Crest moved to
compel arbitration. Barba was able to establish that her son lacked capac-
ity to contract.106 Thus, Oak Crest could not rely on the doctrine of direct
benefits estoppel, because it would be impossible for Barba or her son to
seek benefits from a contract that did not exist.107
Courts often reject the direct benefits estoppel theory when the non-
signatories’ claims are independent from the agreement that contained
the arbitration clause. Toll Austin, TX, LLC v. Dusing,108 provides an
example of this point. As discussed previously, a subsequent purchaser of
a home was not bound by an arbitration agreement between the original
purchaser and seller. One argument that Toll Austin attempted to compel
arbitration was direct benefits estoppel. The Austin Court of Appeals re-
jected that argument because the Dusings’ claims were based on common
law and statutory law and were not based on the contract.109 The source
104. Id. at *3.
105. No. 03-16-00514-CV, 2016 WL 7046844, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 1, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
106. Id. at *4.
107. Id.
108. No. 03-16-00621-CV, 2016 WL 7187482, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 7, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
109. Id. at *3.
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of the claims made direct benefits estoppel inapplicable.110
The First Houston Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Steer
Wealth Management, LLC v. Denson.111 John and Margaret Denson
signed brokerage account agreements with LPL Financial. Steer Wealth
and LPL Financial were related entities. Later, Margaret sued Steer
Wealth for “breach of contract and fraud.”112 According to Steer Wealth,
direct benefits estoppel applied because Margaret was using her contract
with LPL Financial to hold Steer Wealth liable. The court of appeals held
that direct benefits estoppel did not apply because Margaret’s claims
were not based on the Densons’ agreement with LPL Financial.113 In-
stead, her claims arose from a separate contractual relationship between
the Densons and Steer Wealth.114
Patricia Rocha was not compelled to arbitrate in Rocha v. Marks
Transportation.115 Patricia’s husband signed an arbitration agreement
with Marks Transportation when he purchased a vehicle. After the
purchase, Patricia took the vehicle to Marks Transportation to be ser-
viced. Patricia slipped in the waiting area, and sued Marks Transportation
based on injuries she sustained. The First Houston Court of Appeals held
that direct benefits estoppel did not apply because Patricia’s claims were
not based on the contract between Patricia’s husband and the dealer-
ship.116 Patricia sued Marks Transportation for premises liability, and not
for breach of contract.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas determined
that Pavecon was not required to arbitrate its claims in Pavecon Holding
Co. v. Tuzinski.117 Pavecon sued Tuzinski for abuse of trade secret infor-
mation. Pavecon was not required to arbitrate because “Pavecon’s claims
do not seek to enforce terms within the [arbitration agreement], and the
merits of Pavecon’s claims can be adjudicated without referring to that
document.”118
Several cases from this Survey period illustrate that a non-signatory
“cannot both have [their] contract and defeat it too.”119 When a non-
signatory seeks to obtain benefits from a contract that contains an arbi-
tration agreement, the non-signatory will be compelled to arbitrate. For
example, in Sam Houston Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Berry, the plain-
tiffs, Berry and Cano, were compelled to arbitrate their claims against
110. See id.
111. 537 S.W.3d 558, 571 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
112. Id. at 561.
113. Id. at 571.
114. Id.
115. 512 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
116. Id. at 538.
117. No. 4:16-CV-888-ALM-CAN, 2017 WL 2540581, at *4 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2017).
118. Id. at *4.
119. Sam Houston Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Berry, No. 09-16-00346-CV, 2017 WL 4319849,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 28. 2016, no pet.) (quoting In re Weekley Homes, LP,
180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005)).
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Sam Houston.120 Berry and Cano’s claims were all based on Sam Hous-
ton’s 2012 Bylaws. The plaintiffs sought damages based on Sam Hous-
ton’s breach of the Bylaws. Thus, the plaintiffs were required to comply
with the arbitration clause in the Bylaws.121
Deosaran v. Ace Cash Express122 also illustrates this point. Deosaran
and Goodwin sued Ace Cash Express after Ace Cash allegedly violated
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Goodwin obtained a loan from
Ace Cash, and signed an agreement that contained an arbitration clause.
Deosaran did not sign any agreements with Ace Cash. Ace Cash at-
tempted to compel Deosaran and Goodwin to arbitrate their claims. The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that Goodwin
could be compelled to arbitrate, but Deosaran could not be compelled to
arbitrate.123 Deosaran’s claims existed separately from the contracts, and
she did not seek to benefit from the contract.124 Thus, she could not be
compelled to arbitrate based on direct benefits estoppel.125
Direct benefits estoppel allowed Lexington Insurance Company to
compel Exxon to arbitrate its claims.126 A fire occurred while Brock Ser-
vices was performing work at an Exxon refinery. Exxon required Brock
Services to list Exxon as an additional insured party through Lexington
Insurance Company. In an attempt to recover under the policy, Exxon
sued Lexington. On appeal, the Beaumont Court of Appeals granted
Lexington’s motion to compel arbitration because of direct benefits es-
toppel.127 Exxon sought to benefit from the insurance policy, so Exxon
could not avoid the arbitration provision.128
Other cases in this Survey period illustrate that non-signatories can be
bound by arbitration agreements when the non-signatory’s lawsuit seeks
to obtain a benefit from the contract.129
120. Id. at *6–7.
121. Id.
122. No. 4:16-CV-00919-O-BP, 2017 WL 1518568, (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2017), adopted
by 2017 WL 1296453 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2017).
123. Id. at *3–4.
124. Id. at *3–4.
125. Id.
126. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-16-00357-CV, 2017 WL 1532271,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
127. Id. at *2, *8.
128. Id. at *2.
129. See, e.g., Diverse Enters., Co., LLC v. Beyond Int’l, Inc., No. SA-16-CV-1036-
RCL, 2017 WL 4276832, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2017); Petrobras Am. Inc., v. Cadenas,
276 F. Supp. 3d 691, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Heritage Capital Corp. v. Christie’s, Inc., No.
3:16-CV-3404-D, 2017 WL 1550514, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2017) (mem. op.); Bailey v.
Healthsouth Corp., No. 9:15-CV-57, 2017 WL 664445, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2017); Dar-
gahi v. Handa, No. 03-17-00386-CV, 2017 WL 5247517, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 8,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Saks v. Rogers, No. 04-16-00286-CV, 2017 WL 3159712, at *8
(Tex. App.—San Antonio July 26, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); My Three Sons, Ltd. v.
Midway/Parker Med. Ctr., L.P., No. 05-15-01068-CV, 2017 WL 2351082, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Dallas May 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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2. Equitable Estoppel
The doctrine of equitable estoppel also appeared during this Survey
period. A signatory plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration when the plaintiff
seeks to hold a non-signatory defendant liable under a contract that con-
tains an arbitration clause.130 As previously mentioned, in Waterstone on
Lake Conroe, Inc. v. Williams,131 the Williamses sued Waterstone, Virgin,
and Steve Bowen after a dispute arose about the construction of the Wil-
liamses’ new home. Waterstone could compel arbitration under the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel because the claims against Waterstone were
“intertwined with and dependent upon the purchase agreement.”132 The
Williamses could not determine who was responsible for the construction
defect that formed the center of their complaint, and the Williamses ar-
gued that “the separateness” between Virgin and Waterstone
“ceased.”133 Under these facts, Waterstone could compel arbitration
based on equitable estoppel.134
Equitable estoppel allowed Sears to compel arbitration in Mayton v.
Tempoe, LLC.135 Mayton went to Sears with the intent to purchase a
mattress set, but according to Mayton, he did not know that he was actu-
ally entering into a lease agreement with Tempoe that contained an arbi-
tration clause. When Mayton realized what happened he sued Sears and
Tempoe. Sears could compel arbitration even though it was a non-signa-
tory because Mayton treated Sears and Tempoe as “a single unit.”136
Also, Mayton’s claims against Sears were based on Mayton’s lease agree-
ment with Tempoe. This led the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas to compel Mayton to arbitrate his claims against Sears.137
The doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be used to compel a non-
signatory plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against a signatory defendant.138
Sentry Select Insurance Co. v. Ruiz139 illustrates this point. In that case,
North American Capacity Insurance Company sought to compel Sentry
to arbitrate its claims based on an arbitration agreement that was not
signed by Sentry. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas determined that equitable estoppel did not apply because Sentry
was a non-signatory plaintiff.140 The district court noted that equitable
estoppel “only applies to keep a signatory from avoiding its arbitration
130. See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir.
2000).
131. No. 09-17-00071-CV, 2017 WL 3298234, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 3, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
132. Id. at *5.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *6.
135. No. SA-17-CV-179-XR, 2017 WL 2484849, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 7, 2017).
136. Id. at *6.
137. Id. at *6.
138. See Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, No. EP-16-CV-00376-DCG, 2017 WL 2692643,
at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 20, 2017) (mem. op.); see also Deosaran v. Ace Cash Express, Inc.,
No. 4:16-CV-00919-O-BP, 2017 WL 1318568, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2017).




F. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
A non-signatory can compel arbitration if the non-signatory can prove
that it is a third party beneficiary to the agreement that contains the arbi-
tration clause. One case from this Survey period, Athas Health, LLC v.
Trevithich,142 provides a good example. Paul Trevithick’s estate sued
Athas after Trevithick died following a spinal procedure that Athas or-
ganized for Trevithick. The Dallas Court of Appeals determined that
Athas was likely a party to the arbitration agreement,143 but even if
Athas was not a party to the contract, Athas could compel arbitration
because Athas was a third party beneficiary.144 The arbitration agreement
contained the phrase “Dispute Resolution/Arbitration Between You and
Athas.”145 The court of appeals determined that Athas could enforce the
arbitration agreement because this language showed a clear intent for
Athas to benefit from the arbitration clause.146
If the non-signatory cannot show that there was a clear intent for the
non-signatory to benefit from the agreement the non-signatory cannot
compel arbitration. Steer Wealth Management, LLC v. Denson147 pro-
vides an illustration. As mentioned previously, John and Margaret Den-
son signed brokerage account agreements with LPL Financial. Steer
Wealth claimed that it was a third party beneficiary to the agreements.
The First Houston Court of Appeals determined that the agreement be-
tween the Densons and LPL Financial did not express a clear intent to
benefit Steer Wealth.148 Although the contract stated that the arbitration
agreement applies to controversies “between [Denson] and LPL and/or
your Representative(s) [,]” Steer Wealth did not meet the contractual
definition of “Representative.”149 Steer Wealth could not prove that it
was a third party beneficiary because it could not establish that the Den-
sons and LPL Financial intended to benefit Steer Wealth when the parties
entered into the agreement.150
141. Id. (quoting US Health Grp., Inc. v. South, 636 Fed. App’x 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam)) (emphasis omitted).
142. No. 05-16-00219-CV, 2017 WL 655926, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2017 no
pet.) (mem. op.).
143. The motion to compel was based on two arbitration agreements: the “user agree-
ment” and the “financial agreement.” The financial agreement indicates that Red River
Spine is the medical provider and Dr. Will is the attending physician. However, the agree-
ment does not limit the application of the agreement only to Red River Spine and Dr. Will.
Thus, the court of appeals determined that Athas was likely a party to the contract, but the
court of appeals went on to analyze the third party beneficiary argument. Id. at *3.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *4.
146. Id.
147. 537 S.W.3d 558, 571 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
148. Id. at 567–68.
149. Id. at 567.
150. Id. at 567–68
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Additionally, a non-signatory who was an intended beneficiary of a
contract can be compelled to arbitrate its claims against a signatory. In
Reliable Energy Solutions v. Amalfi Apartment Corporation,151 Amalfi
was compelled to arbitrate because it was a third party beneficiary to an
agreement between Tremar and Reliable. Amalfi owned an apartment
complex. Tremar and Amalfi entered into a general contract agreement
for renovations to the property that Amalfi owned. Pursuant to this gen-
eral contract agreement, Tremar and Reliable entered into a subcontrac-
tor agreement. The subcontractor agreement contained an arbitration
clause. When Reliable did not receive payment, it sued Tremar and
Amalfi. Tremar moved to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, to com-
pel arbitration. Amalfi contended that since it did not sign the subcon-
tract agreement it cannot be compelled to arbitrate. The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that Amalfi was an in-
tended beneficiary of the agreement after considering “the intention of
the parties, and the nature of the contractual relationship.”152
IV. COURT INVOLVEMENT
This section details two issues concerning court involvement that came
up often in this Survey period’s arbitration cases. First, this section dis-
cusses what constitutes a “final order” in the context of arbitration cases.
Second, this section discusses expansion of judicial review of arbitration
awards.
A. FINAL ORDERS
Generally, appellate cases from this Survey period illustrate that the
appellate court lacks jurisdiction when the trial court does not issue a
final order.153 Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Charles154 provides an inter-
esting twist on what constitutes a “final order.” Plaintiff, Charles, sued
Green Tree and various other entities. This case was removed to federal
district court. Later, the defendants brought a separate case to compel
arbitration. The district court compelled arbitration in that case and dis-
missed the case with prejudice, but the original case was still pending. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction
to review the order compelling arbitration because “[a]n arbitration order
entering a stay, as opposed to a dismissal, is not an appealable final or-
151. No. 4:16-cv-03346, 2017 WL 3412198 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2017) (mem. op.), adopted
by 2017 WL 3394613 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2017).
152. Id. at *4.
153. Hobzek v. HomeAway.com, Inc., No. 17-50144, 2017 WL 3630286, at *1 (5th Cir.
June 21, 2017) (per curiam); Bordelon Marine, L.L.C. v. Bibby Subsea ROV, L.L.C., 685
Fed. App’x 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Galaxy Builders, Ltd. v. Globus Mgmt.
Grp., LLC, No. 05-17-00831-CV, 2017 WL 4349096, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 2, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the trial court order
was not a final order even though it stated that it was a final order); Chowdhury v. Tata
Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 05-17-00351-CV, 2017 WL 2610661, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas,
June 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
154. 872 F.3d 637, 638 (5th Cir. 2017).
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der.”155 The Fifth Circuit considered both cases together, and determined
that there was essentially an order compelling arbitration and a stay of
the proceedings even though the order compelling arbitration and the
stay occurred in two different cases.156 The Fifth Circuit applied this rea-
soning to several additional cases involving Green Tree Servicing,
LLC.157
B. EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
During this Survey period, there were a few notable cases that applied
the Nafta Traders v. Quinn158 rule. In Nafta Traders, the Texas Supreme
Court determined that, under the TAA, parties can contract for expanded
judicial review by “clear agreement.”159 The cases from this Survey pe-
riod show that courts are strictly applying the Nafta Traders “clear agree-
ment” rule. If there is not a clear agreement to expanded judicial review,
the court will only allow for narrow judicial review. In each of the cases
discussed below, a party unsuccessfully attempted to use a provision in
the arbitration agreement to expand judicial review.
In Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle,160 the arbitration agree-
ment allowed the arbitration panel “to award punitive damages where
allowed by Texas substantive law.”161 Forest Oil argued that this language
indicated that the parties contracted for expanded judicial review. The
Texas Supreme Court held the language in the agreement did not express
a “clear agreement” for expanded judicial review.162 Other sections in the
agreement called for application of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
and allowed the district court to review the arbitrator’s actions using an
“abuse of discretion standard.”163 The section on exemplary damages did
not contain the same provisions, so the supreme court did not expand
judicial review regarding exemplary damages.164
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals determined that the parties
did not clearly express an intent to provide for expanded judicial review
in the arbitration agreement in Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Texcal Energy
S. Tex., L.P.165 Denbury cited to a statement in the agreement to argue
that the parties sought to expand judicial review: “[a]n appeal from an
order or judgment of the [p]anel shall be taken in the manner and to the
155. Id. at 639.
156. Id. at 639–40.
157. See Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Miller, 704 Fed. App’x 384, 385 (5th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam); Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Haynes (In re Haynes), 704 Fed. App’x 387,
388 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Dove, 701 Fed. App’x
385, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Ducksworth, 701
Fed. App’x 384, 385 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
158. 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
159. Id. at 101.
160. 518 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. 2017).




165. 513 S.W.3d 511, 517–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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same extent as from orders or judgment in civil cases under Texas
law.”166 The court of appeals determined that this language was not
enough to expand judicial review.167 In fact, the parties actually con-
tracted for a more narrow form of judicial review because the agreement
limited the grounds for vacatur to fraud or corruption.168 The court of
appeals noted that even if the choice to narrow judicial review was not
enforceable, Denbury still did not meet its burden under the FAA or the
TAA to show that the panel exceeded its authority.169
In Jones v. Carlos & Parnell,170 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
expanded judicial review was not applicable. The National Health Law-
yers Association’s pre-existing rules were mentioned in the agreement.
The rules allowed the arbitrator “to render any relief authorized by con-
tract or applicable law that appears to be fair under the circumstances
and to sign the award, in compliance with applicable state and federal
law.”171 According to the court of appeals, this language does not clearly
show that the parties intended for expanded judicial review to apply.172
Additionally, expanded judicial review was not warranted, even though
Texas law controlled the agreement, and the arbitrator could use the
Texas Rules of Procedure for guidance on discovery issues.173 Those pro-
visions were not enough to show that there was a clear intent to contract
for expanded judicial review.174
Lastly, in Methodist Healthcare Systems, Ltd. v. Friesenhahn,175 Meth-
odist cited to three sections of the agreement in support of its argument
that expanded judicial review was contemplated. The San Antonio Court
of Appeals held that the arbitration agreement did not contain “any lan-
guage referencing judicial review or a standard applicable in a conven-
tional judicial review.”176 Each of the provisions Methodist cited simply
illustrated the arbitrator’s power, and were not sufficient to expand judi-
cial review.177
C. GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OR MODIFICATION
A party to an arbitration can move to vacate an award under one of the
four statutory grounds for vacatur.178 A court will not vacate an arbitra-
166. Id. at 517–18.
167. Id. at 519.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 519–20.
170. No. 05-17-00329-CV, 2017 WL 4930896, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 31, 2017,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).




175. No. 04-16-00824-CV, 2017 WL 4518284, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 11,
2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (2002); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 171.088(a)(1)–(4) (West 2011).
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tion award unless a party to the arbitration can successfully raise one of
the four grounds for vacatur.179 In order to successfully vacate an arbitra-
tion award, the party must object before the arbitration award is con-
firmed and final judgement is rendered.180 The following section provides
examples of cases where a party argued that an arbitration award should
be vacated due to one of the statutory grounds for vacatur.
1. Corruption, Fraud, or Undue Means
Mistake of law is not enough to amount to undue means. IOC Co.,
LLC v. City of Edinburg181 illustrates this point. The City argued that the
arbitrator did not apply a local government code correctly. The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals held that “[e]ven if the arbitrator made minor
errors or misapplied [the code] to the facts of this case, as the City argues,
such a mistake of law is not enough to amount to undue means.”182
2. Evident Partiality
When the party seeking to vacate the award can prove evident partial-
ity or corruption, the court should vacate the arbitration award. The
plaintiff proved evident partiality in Builders First Source South Texas LP
v. Ortiz.183 The arbitrator did not disclose that Builders First’s attorney
“appeared before her twice in the past.”184 When the plaintiff’s attorney
joined a telephone hearing phone call, “the conversation between [the
arbitrator] and [Builders First’s attorney] was extremely friendly and ap-
peared to joke about [the arbitrator’s] favorable decisions for [Builders
First’s attorney] in past [a]rbitrations.”185 This led the Fourteenth Hous-
ton Court of Appeals to determine that the arbitration award should be
vacated due to evident partiality.186
3. Failure to Postpone the Hearing, Hear Evidence, or Any Other
Misbehavior that Prejudiced a Party
The arbitration panel refused to hear pertinent and material evidence
179. See Brendel v. Meyrowitz, No. 3:15-CV-1928-D, 2017 WL 1178244, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 30, 2017); Valdes v. Whataburger Rests., LLC, No. 14-16-00222-CV, 2017 WL
2602728, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Guerra v. L&F Distribs., LLC, 521 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no
pet.).
180. See Quickset Concrete, Inc. v. Roeschco Constr., Inc., No. 05-16-00509-CV, 2017
WL 4021113, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also
Dotcom Co. v. DP Sols, Inc., No. 12-16-00340-CV, 2017 WL 3224887, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Tyler July 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
181. No. 13-16-00117-CV, 2017 WL 3084293, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July
20, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
182. Id.
183. 515 S.W.3d 451, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
184. Id. at 454.
185. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
186. Id. at 460.
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in Parker v. Interactive Brokers, LLC.187 The Parkers sued the trustee
who was managing their trust fund, and initiated an arbitration proceed-
ing against Interactive Brokers. A portion of the trust fund was located in
a brokerage account at Interactive Brokers. During oral arguments, in
the arbitration, the Parkers’ attorney told the arbitrator panel that the
trustee was going to file for bankruptcy. Later, Interactive Brokers at-
tempted to introduce evidence that the trustee was not going to declare
bankruptcy despite the Parkers’ claims, but the panel refused to accept it.
The First Houston Court of Appeals vacated the award.188 The panel ex-
pressly considered the Parkers’ statement that the trustee was going to
file for bankruptcy, so the evidence that Interactive Brokers wanted to
introduce to prove that the trustee was not going to file for bankruptcy
was pertinent and material.189
4. Exceeded Powers
When an arbitrator exceeds her power, the arbitration award should be
vacated. The arbitrators exceeded their powers in Higginson v. Martin.190
The attorneys representing both parties signed a proposed arbitration
award. The arbitration panel did not accept the settlement agreement
even though both parties agreed that the dispute was settled. Instead, the
panel issued its own award. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that
vacatur was proper because the jurisdiction of the panel ended when the
parties settled their dispute.191
In Gilbert v. Rain & Hail Insurance,192 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals held that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers. The arbitration
agreement delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator. The parties agreed to
arbitrate issues of arbitrability, so the arbitrator did not abuse his discre-
tion when he overruled Gilbert’s objections to arbitration.193
5. Modification of Arbitration awards
In re S.M.H.194 demonstrates that arbitration awards can be modified
by the trial court in certain circumstances. In that case, the arbitration
agreement called for the arbitrator to select either the mother’s proposal
or the father’s proposal. The arbitrator did not have the authority to
make any changes to either proposal. The arbitrator selected the mother’s
proposal but added a section on possession of the child. The Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals determined that modification under the Texas
187. No. 01-15-00943-CV, 2017 WL 3597735, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Aug. 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
188. Id. at *11.
189. Id.
190. No. 07-15-00343-CV, 2017 WL 603626, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 14, 2017,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
191. Id.
192. No. 02-16-00277-CV, 2017 WL 710702, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 23,
2017, pet denied) (mem. op.).
193. Id.
194. 523 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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Civil Practices and Remedies Code § 171.091(a)(2) was proper.195 The
parties agreed to arbitrate the support issue, the possession issue was not
arbitrable, and it was possible to remove the possession portion from the
award without affecting the rest of the award.196
D. WAIVER
When considering whether a party waived its right to compel arbitra-
tion, courts require that the party opposing arbitration show more than
inconvenient timing or long delay.197 The cases that follow provide exam-
ples of situations where the judicial process was substantially invoked.
In Vine v. PLS Financial Services,198 PLS loaned Vine and Pond
money. PLS required Vine and Pond to give PLS “blank or post-dated
checks.”199 Despite the fact that PLS told Vine and Pond that the checks
would never be cashed, PLS attempted to cash the checks when Vine and
Pond defaulted. When the checks bounced, PLS filed worthless check af-
fidavits with the district attorney’s office. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that PLS substantially invoked the judicial pro-
cess.200 A key consideration in this case was that PLS used the worthless
check proceeding as a way to avoid arbitration.201 Indeed, PLS’s “strat-
egy to collect on outstanding debt” was the use of the worthless check
affidavits.202 The Fifth Circuit determined that PLS waived the right to
compel arbitration because PLS should not be given “a second bite at the
apple through arbitration.”203
In Janvey v. Alguire,204 one of the defendants, Giusti, substantially in-
voked the judicial process when “Giusti participated in discovery and
other pre-trial litigation” after he was sued in 2011. Later, in 2014, he
moved to compel arbitration. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that a “primary
justification[ ]” for arbitration is to avoid the cost of litigation, and since
Giusti engaged in discovery he could not compel arbitration.205 The re-
cord demonstrated prejudice because there was a three year gap between
the initiation of the suit and the motion to compel arbitration. This re-
sulted in increased litigation costs and undue delay.
195. Id. at 788, 790.
196. Id. at 790.
197. See, e.g., Tom Wright Constr., LLC v. JDM Steel Constr., LLC, No. 10-17-00124-
CV, 2017 WL 4543651, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 11, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Tan-
trum St. LLC v. Carson, No. 05-16-01096-CV, 2017 WL 3275901, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas
July 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Fisher v. Carlile, No. 01-16-00615-CV, 2017 WL
2774486, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Lego-
land Discovery Ctr. (Dallas), LLC v. Superior Builders, LLC, 531 S.W.3d 218, 222–23 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.).
198. 689 Fed. App’x 800, 801 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
199. Id.




204. 847 F.3d 231, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2017).
205. Id.
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The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined
that the defendant substantially invoked the judicial process in Forby v.
One Technologies LP,206 but did not waive the right to arbitrate. One
Technologies invoked the judicial process because it did not attempt to
compel arbitration until the district court ruled on its motion to dismiss
with prejudice, successfully dismissed some of Forby’s claims, and did not
seek to compel arbitration until thirteen months after removal to federal
court. The district court held that despite the fact that One Technologies
substantially invoked the judicial process, the plaintiff was not
prejudiced.207 The plaintiff could only point to delay as a source of
prejudice, and this alone was insufficient to support waiver of the right to
compel arbitration.208
The result in Leal v. Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc.209 is opposite the re-
sult in Forby v. One Technologies, LP. The defendants removed the case
to federal court and filed a substantive motion to dismiss. Instead of
granting the motion to dismiss, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Then the
defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court determined
that the defendant’s actions that prejudiced the plaintiff resulted in
waiver of the right to compel arbitration.210
Parish waived her right to compel arbitration in Parish v. Macy’s Retail
Holdings.211 Parish did not mention arbitration during her “aggressive
prosecution of her claims” against Macy’s.212 She litigated for ten months
and moved for arbitration after “she saw that things were not going as
favorably to her in the litigation as she would like.”213 Macy’s would have
been prejudiced if the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas granted the motion to compel arbitration, because Macy’s incurred
about $175,000 to defend the suit, the motion came at a “crucial time in
the litigation,” and Macy’s would have to re-litigate issues in arbitration
that were “already successfully litigated” in the trial court.214
Each of the cases in this section indicate that it was not just the timing
of the motion to compel that caused the court to hold that the right to
arbitrate was waived. Courts analyze all of the actions of the party that is
seeking to compel arbitration, and must find prejudice to the party op-
posing arbitration by the movant’s actions and omissions. This require-
ment aligns with the “strong federal policy in favor of enforcing
206. Forby v. One Techs., LP, No. 3:16-CV-856-L, 2017 WL 2930514, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex.
July 10, 2017) (mem. op.).
207. Id. at *6.
208. Id. at *5.
209. No. A-16-CV-679 LY, 2017 WL 1458810, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2017).
210. Id. at *2–4.
211. No. 4:17-CV-120-A, 2017 WL 5484665, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2017) (mem. op.).
212. Id.
213. Id.




This Survey period found numerous state and federal courts asked to
consider issues arising out of arbitration. The resulting reported cases
contain no first impression holdings. The cases do provide additional clar-
ification and amplification of well-known arbitration jurisprudence. A
number of these cases also reflect involvement of counsel inexperienced
with arbitration, and provide examples of poorly drafted pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements.
215. Leal v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., No. A-16-CV-679 LY, 2017 WL 1458810, at *2
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2017) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217
(1985)).
